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The Importance of Models in Theorizing: A Deflationary Semantic View

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Stephen M. Downes
Stephen M. Downes*
Affiliation:
University of Utah
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Extract

It is commonly acknowledged in science that model construction is one of the most important components of theorizing. Philosophers of science are gradually coming to acknowledge this situation, spurred on by holders of the semantic view of theories. In this paper I wish to defend a very deflationary version of the semantic view of theories, which is more or less a re-statement of the above commonplace. I reject the view encapsulated in the identity statement “scientific theories are families of models,” although acknowledging the useful insights into science that holders of this strong position have given us. My position derives from a critique of various of the semantic views of theories, and further from a guiding presupposition that rather than providing necessary and sufficient conditions for what a theory is, philosophers should focus on the nature of scientific theorizing. Theorizing is carried out by practicing scientists, and we cannot say what scientific theories are unless we appreciate the myriad ways they are used and developed in all of the sciences.

Type
Part IV. Issues in Methodology
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1992 , 1992 , pp. 142 - 153
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

I am grateful to Arthur Fine and Todd Grantham for discussing the semantic view of theories with me, and to David Hull and Tom Ryckman for comments on drafts of the paper. Financial support was provided by a post-doctoral fellowship from Northwestern University.

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