Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2022
The central theme of this paper is that historical contingency plays an essential and ineliminable role in the construction and selection of a successful scientific theory from among its observationally equivalent and unrefuted competitors. Let me make a few clarifying remarks at the outset. It is not my claim that in all cases of theory selection there is in practice this radical type of underdetermination. Nor am I concerned with the rather trivial and philosophically uninteresting historical contingency of who did what when. For example, in response to Napoléon’s fishing for a favorable comparison between himself and Newton, Lagrange is said to have lamented (Gillispie 1960, p. 117; Moritz 1914, p. 167): “Newton was the greatest genius that ever existed, and the most fortunate, for we cannot find more than once a system of the world established.“
Partial support for this work was provided by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. DIR89-08497.