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Habermas and the Natural Sciences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Gary Gutting
Gary Gutting*
Affiliation:
University of Notre Dame
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Extract

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Habermas’ fundamental philosophical project is to reinstate, in a contemporary context, the classical idea that human lives can be guided by practical knowledge; i.e., that it is possible to know what are the ultimate human values and direct our lives in accord with this knowledge:2 This project has a central importance because of the ironic turn taken by the development of contemporary society. Previously, societies generally thought they had a clear and rationally founded notion of the ultimate values that should guide human lives; but they lacked the technical resources needed to implement (or remove obstacles to) these values. Today, we have the technical resources to at least make a significant effort toward the realization of our values. But the very scientific advances that have provided these technical resources have called into question the rational bases of traditional values and even led to the suggestion—urged by the positivists—that our ultimate values have no cognitive status but are merely irrational givens.

Type
Part X. Habermas
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1978 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1978 , 1978 , pp. 424 - 437
Copyright
Copyright © 1981 Philosophy of Science Association

Footnotes

1

I am grateful to Karl Ameriks, Fred Dallmayr, Mary Hesse, Larry Simon, and Jerry Wallulis for comments on the original version of this paper.

References

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