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Functionalism and the Negative Feedback Model in Biology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Edward Manier
Edward Manier*
Affiliation:
University of Notre Dame
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Extract

Any study of the philosophical literature dealing with the cluster of topics generally identified as ‘functional description’, ‘functional analysis’, and ‘teleological explanation’ naturally raises the problem of confirming, disconfirming, or at least relating the alternative logical models proposed by philosophers to the actual usage of biologists. A close examination of current biological literature reveals that acceptance or rejection of what philosophers or sociologists might call a ‘functionalist’ perspective or approach is not significant for the division of biologists into schools or factions. It is certainly not the case that a functionalist perspective distinguishes the wholistic or organismic faction from the molecular biologists. In fact, molecular biologists shift back and forth from ‘functional’ to simple causal perspectives with considerable indifference. This is particularly true of the literature based upon the so-called operon hypothesis developed by the Nobel laureates Jacob and Monod.

Type
Contributed Papers
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1970 , 1970 , pp. 225 - 240
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1970

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Footnotes

*

Research supported in part by NSF Grant GS 1236 and the O'Brien Fund, University of Notre Dame.

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