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The Evolution of Scientific Lineages

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Michael Bradie
Michael Bradie*
Affiliation:
Bowling Green State University
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The fundamental dialectic of Science as a Process is the interaction between two narrative levels. At one level, the book is a historical narrative of one aspect of one ongoing problem in systematics - the dispute between cladists and more traditional evolutionary taxonomists and amongst the cladists themselves on the correct method of classifying species. This narrative is replete with details of the process whereby scientists promote and publish their ideas. It is an informative and somewhat ‘racy’ account of the rough and tumble battleground of ideas which puts the lie to the mythical ideal of the scientist as disinterested pursuer of the Truth. At the second level, Hull presents a theoretical model of the scientific process - a model which draws heavily on invoked similarities between biological and scientific change. The narrative serves as the evidence for the model. The model, in turn, helps shape the historical narrative.

Type
Part VI. Science As Process
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1990 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1990 , 1990 , pp. 245 - 254
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1991

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