Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 January 2023
The conflation of two fundamentally distinct issues has generated serious confusion in the philosophical and biological literature concerning the units of selection. The questions of how a unit of selection is defined, theoretically, is rarely distinguished from the question of how to determine the empirical accuracy of claims--either specific or general--concerning which unit(s) are undergoing selection processes. In this paper, I begin by refining a definition of the unit of selection, first presented by William Wimsatt, that is grounded in the structure of natural selection models. I then explore the implications of this definition for empirical evaluation of group selection models. I examine an objection to Wimsatt’s definition raised by Elliott Sober, and I conclude by indicating how the proposed refined definition can clarify which sorts of empirical evidence could be brought to bear on group selection controversies.
I would particularly like to thank Dick Lewontin for discussing the units of selection problem with me, and for his helpful advice, criticism, and suggestions. For their valuable comments and criticism, I would also like to thank Bas.van Fraassen, Evelyn Fox Keller, Bill Wimsatt, Steve Orzack, Dick Burian, Robert Brandon, Deborah Gordon, Hamish Spencer, David Hull, and Jim Griesemer.