Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-fscjk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T18:45:29.598Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Decisions in Dynamic Settings

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Paul Weirich
Paul Weirich*
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

The expected utility of an option for a decision maker is defined with respect to probability and utility functions that represent the decision maker’s beliefs and desires. Therefore, as the decision maker’s beliefs and desires change, the expected utility of an opinion may change. Some options are such that their realizations change beliefs and desires in ways that change the expected utilities of the options. If a decision is made among options that include one or more of these special options, I call it a decision made in a dynamic setting.

The rule to maximize expected utility, MEU, is insufficient for decisions in dynamic settings. It does not say how to take account of information about the way in which the realization of an option would change the expected utility of the option.

Type
Part VII. Probability And Causality
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1986 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1986 , 1986 , pp. 438 - 449
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1986

Footnotes

1

I am indebted to Reed Richter for stimulating correspondence on the topic of this paper.

References

Eells, Ellery. (1984). “Metatickles and the Dynamics of Deliberation.” Theory and Decision 17: 71–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eells, Ellery. (1985). “Weirich on Decision Instability.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63: 473–478.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibbard, Allan and Harper, William. (1978). “Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility.” In Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. Volume 1. Edited by C.A. Hooker, J.J. Leach, and E.F. McClennen. Dordrecht: Reldel. Pages 125-162.Google Scholar
Harper, William. (1985). “Ratifiability and Causal Decision Theory.” PSA 1984. Volume 2. Edited by Peter D. Asquith and Philip Kitcher. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.Google Scholar
Jeffrey, Richard. (1983). The Logic of Decision. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Richter, Reed. (1984). “Rationality Revisited.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 392–403.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Skyrms, Brian. (1982). “Causal Decision Theory.” The Journal of Philosophy 79: 695–711.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Skyrms, Brian. (1984). Pragmatics and Empiricism. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Sobel, J. Howard (1983). “Expected Utilities and Rational Actions and Choices.” Theoria 49: 159–183.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weirich, Paul. (1985). “Decision Instability.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63: 465–472.CrossRefGoogle Scholar