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The Collapse of Collective Defeat: Lessons from the Lottery Paradox

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Kevin B. Korb
Kevin B. Korb*
Affiliation:
Indiana University
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Extract

Logicism as a philosophical enterprise died a sudden and unnatural death in the early 1930s. The logicist program was an attempt to secure our mathematical knowledge in the indubitable bedrock of our a priori logical intuitions. It was a program very much impressed by the remarkable achievements in formal logic and axiomatics in the early century. While that program is well dead and gone, a research program within artificial intelligence (AI) has come to be known by the same name, sharing with its homonymous predecessor at least that program’s esteem for logic.

Logicism in AI, briefly, is the view that prerequisite to developing an artificially intelligent system we must find means for representing and reasoning with a vast store of prepositional knowledge and that the only viable candidates for representing prepositional knowledge are formal logics (and their associated formal languages).

Type
Part VI. Decision Theory
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1992 , 1992 , pp. 230 - 236
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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