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Causal Decision Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Eller Eells
Eller Eells*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin-Madison
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Extract

Philosophers concerned with the nature of rational decision making have distinguished two paradigms for rational deliberation. According to evidential decision theory, one, should, when faced with alternative courses of action, perform an act whose performance would constitute the best possible evidence that one will, get the good outcomes and not get the bad outcomes. On this paradigm, therefore, deliberation consists in trying to figure out which of the available actions is such that performing it should cause one's beliefs to be altered in such a way that the good outcomes will be as subjectively probable as possible and the bad outcomes as subjectively improbable aspossible, given the constraints imposed by one's prior beliefs. According to causal decision theory, on the-other hand, one should be explicitly concerned with the causal relations between the available acts and the possible outcomes.

Type
Part IV. Causal Decision Theory
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1984 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1984 , 1984 , pp. 176 - 200
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

I thank the university of wisconsin-Madison graduate School for financial support, and Elliott Sober for useful comments an an earlier draft.

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