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Can Scientific History Repeat?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Peter Barker
Peter Barker*
Affiliation:
Memphis State University
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Extract

Kuhn (1962), Lakatos (1978) and Laudan (1977) all subscribe to a view of science which admits the existence of large scale entities differing from theories. Kuhn called these entities ‘paradigms’, Lakatos called them ‘research programs’ and Laudan calls them ‘research traditions’. These entities are distinguished from theories by their historical durability and the unique manner in which they succeed one another. The history of science may be described as a succession of eras during each of which one (or more) of these entities was dominant. During its era of dominance one of these entities may support several incompatible theories which replace one another successively but share certain common features. These features may be (part of) a common ontology, a common set of epistemological standards employed in gathering observational evidence, or common methodological or conceptual directives employed in solving new scientific problems. Although theories may change, these features (or some of these features) do not, instead they are the province of the large scale entity.

Type
Part I. Scientific Problems and Research Traditions
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1980 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1980 , 1980 , pp. 20 - 28
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

My thanks to Larry Laudan, Edward Madden and Sheldon Reaven for criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper.

References

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