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Arguing for the Natural Ontological Attitude

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Joseph Rouse
Joseph Rouse*
Affiliation:
Wesleyan University
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Extract

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In several recent papers, Arthur Fine has developed a far-reaching attack upon both the standard realist interpretations of science and their most prominent anti-realist alternatives (1986a, 1986b, 1986c). In their place, Fine proposes not another position on the realist/anti-realist axis, but an attitude toward science, the “natural ontological attitude” (NOA), which is supposed to remove any felt need for a philosophical interpretation of science.

In this paper I will be concerned with Fine’s reasons for adopting NOA rather than his arguments against realism and anti-realism. Unless these reasons are adequate, Fine’s papers are likely to set off a scramble for new and better arguments concerning realism, rather than the reorientation of the philosophy of science which his polemics are clearly intended to provoke. Thus for my purposes, we can presume that Fine’s criticisms of standard positions are generally sound. The question is whether Fine’s proposed alternative attitude can then satisfy the same argumentative standards.

Type
Part IX. Interpreting Scientific Inference
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1988 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1988 , 1988 , pp. 294 - 301
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1988

Footnotes

1

Earlier versions of the argument in this paper were presented to Arthur Fine’s NEH Summer Seminar on “The Legacy of Realism” in 1987. I am grateful to Professor Fine and the other participants in the seminar for their comments and criticisms.

References

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