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Another Day for an Old Dogma

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Robert J. Levy
Robert J. Levy*
Affiliation:
Wittenberg University
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Extract

In Theory and Evidence, Clark Glymour asserts that many philosophers are convinced that “evidence can only bear on the entire body of our beliefs, and cannot be parceled out here and there“(1980,p.5). Attributing this view to Quine, Glymour says:

No working scientist acts as though the entire sweep of scientific theory faces the tribunal of experience as a single, undifferentiated whole; nor, I think, does any working person act so with regard to his beliefs. On the contrary, much of the scientist’s business is to construct arguments that aim to show that a particular piece of experiment or observation bears on a particular piece of theory, and such arguments are among the most celebrated accomplishments in the history of our sciences (1980,p.3).

Some philosophers might counter that Glymour’s criticisms apply properly to a view Quine had significantly modified two decades before the publication of Theory and Evidence.

Type
Part IV. Issues in Methodology
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1992 , 1992 , pp. 131 - 141
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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