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Theory-ladenness of Perception Arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Michael A. Bishop
Michael A. Bishop*
Affiliation:
Iowa State University
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Extract

The theory-ladenness of perception argument is not an argument at all. It is two clusters of arguments. The first cluster is empirical. These arguments typically begin with a discussion of one or more of the following psychological phenomena: (a) the conceptual penetrability of the visual system, (b) voluntary perceptual reversal of ambiguous figures, (c) adaptation to distorting lenses, or (d) expectation effects. From this evidence, proponents of theory-ladenness typically conclude that perception is in some sense “laden” with theory. The second cluster attempts to extract deep epistemological lessons from this putative fact Some philosophers conclude that science is not (in any traditional sense) a rational activity (Feyerabend 1975); while others conclude that we must radically reconceptualize what scientific rationality involves (Kuhn 1970; Churchland 1979).

Type
Part VIII. Kuhnian Themes: SSR at Thirty
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1992 , 1992 , pp. 287 - 299
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

I would like to thank Paul Boghossian, Paul Churchland, Eric Gampel, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Patricia Kitcher, David Magnus, Joe Mendola, Sam Mitchell, Graham Nerlich, Stephen Stich and my colleagues at Iowa State University for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I owe special thanks to Philip Kitcher for guidance that invariably led in fruitful directions.

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