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Some Current Trends in Philosophy of Science: With Special Attention to Confirmation, Theoretical Entities, and Mind-Body

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Grover Maxwell
Grover Maxwell*
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
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Extract

This discussion will be limited to two main topics, the existence of and our knowledge of unobservable entities, on the one hand, and problems about the confirmation of our knowledge claims (scientific and common sense ones), on the other. Unfortunately, this isn’t much of a limitation; for the topics are so large, and their ramifications and implications are so numerous and run so deep that the most that a brief treatment such as this can accomplish is to hit a few of the high spots and, I hope, to generate a little more interest and activity in the areas in question.

It is interesting to me that none of the three of us in this symposium knew much of anything about what subjects the others had selected for their talks and nothing at all, except by way of speculation, about what they were going to say.

Type
Symposium: Development of the Philosophy of Science
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1974 , 1974 , pp. 564 - 584
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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References

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