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Perception and Proper Explanatory Width

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Mark Rollins
Mark Rollins*
Affiliation:
Washington University
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Extract

Marr's theory of vision (1982) is often said to exemplify wide psychology. The claim rests primarily on Marr's appeal to a high level theory of computational functions and secondarily on the sort of representations he posits for computational processes (Burge 1986, 28). I agree that Marr's theory embodies an exemplary form of wide psychology; what is exemplary about it is his appeal to perceptual tasks. But I shall argue that the result of invoking task considerations is that we need not adhere to Marr's own restricted construal of proper width. Indeed, the larger conclusion I want to draw is that there is no single conception of width that has a special place in explanation.

Type
Part XI. Philosophy of Psychology and Perception
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1994 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1994 , 1994 , pp. 437 - 445
Copyright
Copyright © 1994 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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