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Observations as the Building Blocks of Science in 20th-Century Scientific Thought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

J. O. Wisdom
J. O. Wisdom*
Affiliation:
York University, Toronto
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Extract

Although there continue to be many interpretations of the nature of science, not simply thought up from afar by philosophers, but in the highest ranks of scientific circles, there are only a few that are significantly different from one another and influential (Wisdom, 1971). I shall confine myself to instrumentalism, conventionalism, and induction. (I shall omit even operationalism as being easily subsumable under conventionalism.) The main thesis will be that they constitute different ways of regarding knowledge as rooted in pure observation, and that the philosophy of observationalism they presuppose is false. The falsifiability interpretation does not view knowledge in this way and is not discussed here.

Whatever the shortcomings of these three positions may be, however, firmly held or rejected they may be according as one assesses existing criticisms, these criticisms mainly lead to a judicial appraisal without pointing to anything new.

Type
Contributed Papers
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1970 , 1970 , pp. 212 - 222
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1970

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References

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