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Observability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Robert Rynasiewicz
Robert Rynasiewicz*
Affiliation:
Case Western Reserve University
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Extract

Among objects and events in the world some have been or eventually will be observed. Others never have been and never will be. Current wisdom has it that among these latter are those that are nonetheless observable. Furthermore, the class of observable, not just observed, phenomena determines the empirical import of science. As van Fraassen tells us, a theory is empirically adequate if “what the theory says about what is observable (by us) it true.” (1980, p. 18). If there are quibbles with this picture, they are with the feasibility of a nonarbitrary or a theory-neutral distinction between the observable and the unobservable, but not with the idea that there are observable yet forever unobserved objects and events.

This, however, is precisely my quibble. Concrete items of the world—events and objects—are either observed or unobserved but, I urge, are not in addition observable or unobservable. This is not because I deny that a nonarbitrary or theory-neutral distinction can be drawn.

Type
Part VII. Realism and Empiricism
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1984 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1984 , 1984 , pp. 188 - 201
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1984

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Footnotes

1

I would like to thank Ivan Fox, Chin-Tai Kim, Colin McLarty, Ray Nelson, and Robert Wanamaker for comments and criticism. Bas van Fraassen suggested to me several years ago the potential relevance of situation semantics for the problem of empirical content.

References

Barwise, J. and Perry, J. (1983). Situations and Attitudes. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
Maxwell, G. (1962). “The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities.” In Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time. (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume III.) Edited by Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Pages 3-27.Google Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas C. (1980). The Scientific Image. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar