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Evaluating Global and Local Theories of Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Jonathan E. Adler
Jonathan E. Adler*
Affiliation:
Brooklyn College, CUNY
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Extract

The construction of inductive logics is an attempt to explicate the justification for the acceptance, or rational preference, of a given hypothesis on the basis of empirical evidence. As such it is a main part of epistemology. This paper explores this connection by focusing on the epistemic distinction between the grounds that are relevant for justification in normal knowledge-claim contexts (‘local’) and those that are relevant in philosophical knowledge-claim contexts (‘global’).

In Gambling with Truth, Issac Levi introduces the global/local distinction with respect to scepticism and justification. Levi writes,

Supplying this [local] justification requires an appeal to evidence, which will include observation reports and theoretical assumptions, as well as much of the apparatus of logic and mathematics.

Type
Part VI. Induction and Probability
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1976 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1976 , 1976 , pp. 212 - 223
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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