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The Epistemic Authority of Expertise

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Robert Pierson
Robert Pierson*
Affiliation:
York University
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Extract

All of us defer to the authority of experts. Living in a world of increasing specialization we find that deferral to experts is integral to even the most mundane habits of our ordinary life. I regularly complain about mistakes in meteorologist's forecasts, yet I still carry an umbrella when rain is predicted, even when a glance outside reveals that there is not a cloud in the sky. If I develop a rash on my arm and the doctor says that it is nothing more than an allergic reaction, I do not ask her to list all the evidence and reasoning that led her to that conclusion, but trust her judgment and get on with my day. Now, while we defer to experts as a matter of course, we often do so with a measure of resentment and fear.

If it were possible, I suspect that most of us would rather govern what we do according to our own good reasons rather than expert authority.

Type
Part X. Games, Explanations, Authority, and Justification
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1994 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1994 , 1994 , pp. 398 - 405
Copyright
Copyright © 1994 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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