Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2022
With help from Einstein, John Norton and John Earman (1987; this volume) have invented a fascinating argument against spacetime substantivalism. It gives the philosophy of space and time a refreshing stimulus: all credit to them. The idea of the argument is that substantivalism rules out determinism, even of very weak kinds. Norton and Earman have no special brief to defend determinism. But they believe that if it fails, it should fail for reasons of physics that vary from case to case—it should not fail at a stroke for the sake of a philosophical doctrine such as substantivalism. They conclude that in the conflict between substantivalism and determinism, it is substantivalism that must go.
The conflict arises from ‘hole diffeomorphisms’. These enable us, once we are given a model for a spacetime theory, to produce another model.
I would like to thank my co-symposiasts, Philip Catton, John Earman, David Lewis, David Malament, Michael Redhead, Paul Teller and especially, John Norton and Roberto Torretti, for discussions and correspondence.