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Pork Barrel Spending—On the Wane?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Gary J. Andres*
Affiliation:
Dutko and Associates. Inc.

Extract

Is pork barrel spending on the wane? Many think it is, including reformers inside and outside of Congress. Citing the recent decline of earmarks in House appropriations bills for projects in members' districts, reformers suggest that a new era of congressional spending practices is dawning.

This article argues instead that the rise in number of earmarks in the last decade as well as the recent decline depends on whether Congress and the executive branch are controlled by the same or different parties. It further predicts that the Republican takeover of the House and Senate after the 1994 congressional elections could lead to a resurgence of earmarking, in a different form, as long as the Democrats control the White House.

Among scholars, pork barrel spending analysis represents a venerable specialty in the profession, generating some of the most engaging debates and finest research in recent years. This literature analyzes how members of Congress create institutions and use legislative rules to enhance their electoral goals. While not mutually exclusive, the two dominant approaches in recent years are the “distributive” and “informational” models of congressional policy making. (For a good review of the last two decades of scholarly research on the subject, see Krehbiel 1991).

Reformers in the 103rd Congress were emboldened by the success of groups such as the “pork busters,” an informal group led by Representative Harris Fawell (R-IL), who routinely offered amendments to cut pork and unnecessary directed spending in appropriations bills.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 1995

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Footnotes

*

I would like to thank Barry Rundquist, Richard Munson, LeeAnn Petersen, and the anonymous reviewers who made many helpful suggestions for an earlier draft of this paper. I'd also like to thank Emaan Abdelbaki for production help with the graphics.

References

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