Legislative–Executive Relations in Ukraine’s Wartime Conditions

Legislative–executive relations in Ukraine have been contested since the country declared independence in 1991. Power has shifted formally between the legislative and executive branches through constitutional change and the declaration of martial law in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. This Spotlight article investigates the dynamics in legislative–executive relations since the declaration of martial law, highlighting public attitudes about interbranch relations.

Legislative–Executive Relations under Zelensky

Since its independence, Ukraine has witnessed tension over the distribution of power between the president and the parliament (Wise and Brown 1999). This has led to three major amendments to the constitution that regulate the relations between the legislative and executive branches. The 2014 amendment reinstated the 2004 reform, which passed the government-formation process from the president to the parliament (Constitution of Ukraine, Article 114). The law reduced presidential power; however, the substantial victory of the pro-presidential Servant of the People Party in the early-2019 elections increased President Volodymyr Zelensky’s authority because it secured enough seats in parliament to control the agenda and form the cabinet (Vahina and Komar 2020). This victory created a single-party majority in parliament for the first time in Ukraine’s independent history. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and the introduction of martial law magnified presidential power.

The president’s strength vis-à-vis the parliament is enhanced by the right of legislative initiative (Constitution of Ukraine, Article 93). In the ninth convocation of the parliament, President Zelensky proposed 250 draft laws, with a 73% approval rate by deputies (i.e., 182 became laws)—surpassing the government’s draft law approval rate (i.e., 24%) (Zabolotna 2023). Although concerns were expressed about the feasibility of Zelensky’s agenda with his declining popularity in the pre-invasion period (Iwański et al. 2020), he has been able to pass legislation and gain public support—particularly after the full-scale invasion (Onuch and Hale 2023).

Legislative–Executive Relations under Martial Law

Ukraine entered a special legal regime following Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. President Zelensky declared martial law—a declaration that was supported by the parliament through the adoption of corresponding legislation. Compared to peacetime powers, martial law introduces extraordinary powers for executive-branch authorities, military commands, and local self-governmental bodies. Under martial law, the parliament carries out legislative regulation of defense issues and continues to work during a state of war and emergency.

The constitution reinforces parliament’s central role in wartime by stipulating that “in the event of the end of the term of office, the parliament continues to perform its functions until the moment when after the abolition of martial law…a new parliamentary composition is elected” (Constitution of Ukraine, Article 83). Parliament partially amended one resolution to work continuously in plenary sessions and adopted another to instruct the Chairman of the Council to determine the time and place for plenary sessions and voting on legislation.

Although trust in the president increased with the onset of war (Herron and Pelchar 2023), trust in the parliament lags behind that trust. Throughout 2022, the Verkhovna Rada (i.e., the unicameral parliament of Ukraine) witnessed shifts in coalition dynamics, evolving from an informal coalition to a more unified “defense coalition” in response to the threat. Despite unity on the issues of war, the decisions about nonmilitary initiatives faced criticism for lack of both cohesion and transparency due to security measures (Zabolotyi 2023). Parliament has been conducting its business, but the majority party has faced challenges. In early 2024, parliament encountered significant obstacles with absenteeism, thereby preventing action on legislation. The difficulties created by the war—heightened travel restrictions, strained communication channels with other governmental bodies, and a growing perception of the parliament as a scapegoat for unpopular policies—have created obstacles to full participation (Januta 2024). ¹

Public Attitudes about Legislative–Executive Relations in Wartime

How does the public view legislative–executive relations? In cooperation with the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), we have conducted nationally representative surveys in Ukraine since 2020 (Pelchar, Herron, and Flikke 2024). The surveys ask questions about trust in institutions ² and attitudes about interbranch relations. ³ As illustrated in table 1, the legislature consistently has been trusted less than the president; however, both witnessed increased levels of trust following Russia’s full-scale invasion. Both institutions lag well behind the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the most trusted institution among those we evaluated. Since the war began, levels of trust have declined. In the most recent survey, trust in the parliament returned to its prewar level whereas trust in the president remained above the prewar level.

Table 1 Trust in Selected Institutions

Note: The values are the weighted percentages of respondents who indicated that they trusted or somewhat trusted the institutions.

In the June 2024 survey, we also asked respondents about their perceptions of how well selected institutions worked with one another. Table 2 displays the weighted percentages of respondents who selected each category: a cooperative, working, or hostile relationship. Slightly more than 20% of respondents believed that the relationship between the president and the parliament was hostile; this is approximately the same percentage as respondents who believed that the relationship was cooperative. The majority—slightly more than 55%—assessed it as a working relationship with some differences. For comparison, almost 50% of the respondents indicated that the relationship between the president and the Armed Forces was cooperative. Almost the same percentage of respondents evaluated the legislature’s relationship with the Armed Forces as negative.

Table 2 Attitudes about Institutional Relationships

To summarize, whereas Ukrainians have relatively low levels of trust in their institutions—less than 50% currently express trust in the parliament and the president—they also assess the relationship between the president and the parliament to be functional, even under the stresses of the war.

Conclusion

In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, Ukraine has witnessed several changes to its interbranch relationships. The president has increased authority to take actions under martial law and the parliament continues to function as the legislative branch. The parliament has faced challenges, including modifications to its processes and a decline in the number of active members. Although the Ukrainian public often has viewed institutions with skepticism, the parliament and the president gained trust after Russia’s full-scale invasion. The “rally effect” is diminishing, but Ukrainians nevertheless largely view these institutions as maintaining a working relationship even during the war.

The president has increased authority to take actions under martial law and the parliament continues to function as the legislative branch.