Does Turkish-Style Presidentialism Trigger De-Parliamentarization in Türkiye? The Post-2018 Developments

The rationalization of parliament—that is, procedures bolstering productivity and expediting lawmaking—and the empowerment of the executive branch were the cornerstones of Türkiye’s 1982 Constitution. Three key constitutional amendments—the popular presidential election in 2007, the judicial reform in 2010, and the so-called Turkish-Style Presidentialism in 2017—brought about “competitive authoritarianism” in Türkiye (Gençkaya and Dunbay 2024, 14–15). Following the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016, the declaration of a state of emergency lasted for two years. During this time, the referendum for 2017 amendments to the constitution and hastily scheduled early presidential and legislative elections were conducted in 2018. The president’s unrestricted executive powers, weakened legislative functions, and submission of the judiciary have resulted in a concentration of powers in a single authority (Yılmaz 2020, 269–73), as well as the erosion of democratic institutions toward authoritarianism in law and practice (Adar and Seufert 2021, 7). This article assesses the outcomes of the post-2018 developments in legislative–executive relations in Türkiye.

Despite the nondelegation of legislative powers defined by the 1982 Constitution (Article 7) principle of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (GNAT), the 2017 constitutional amendments in Türkiye enhanced the president’s authority to issue executive decrees, appoint or select senior civil and judicial officials, implement a provisional budget to avert a government shutdown and curtailed legislative oversight mechanisms, thereby converting the parliament into a “rubber stamp” institution (Gençkaya 2023).

…the 2017 constitutional amendments in Türkiye enhanced the president’s authority to issue executive decrees, appoint or select senior civil and judicial officials, implement a provisional budget to avert a government shutdown and curtailed legislative oversight mechanisms, thereby converting the parliament into a “rubber stamp” institution.

The changes in GNAT rules and procedures in 2018 further allowed the president to influence the legislative process. The agendas of the parliamentary standing committees—where the People’s Alliance (i.e., “parliamentary coalition”), composed of the Justice and Development Party and the Nationalist Action Party, control the majority—are set by their chairs. The opposition parties’ proposals are unlikely to be included on the agendas, limiting the parliament’s deliberative capacity (Bakırcı 2018, 222–24; Gençkaya 2022, 274–75). Since 2015, and especially after the implementation of presidentialism, the Consultative Council—which is composed of the party groups and presided over by the speaker or deputy speaker of the GNAT—has been unable to create a consensus-based agenda for the plenary (Yeşilırmak 2022). Majoritarian principles underpin the current legislative process in standing committees and the plenary. Autocratization gives prominence to instrumental legislation, expedited legislative processes, and omnibus legislation that disregards the scrutiny of legislation with procedurally compromised elements (Drinóczi and Cormacain 2021, 274).

In this new system, Members of Parliament (MPs) propose laws. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that the president’s administration prepares or preapproves proposals from the ruling party’s MPs before they are submitted to the GNAT. Throughout the 27th (i.e., July 7, 2018 to April 23, 2023) and the initial two years of the 28th legislative terms (i.e., May 15, 2023, to September 30, 2024), 6,432 bills (i.e., 5,339 and 1,093 in corresponding terms) were submitted to the GNAT. Only 41 new acts and 93 omnibus bills (that amended multiple laws) were approved, compared to 209 international treaties that were debated procedurally by the plenary.

Omnibus bills have scattered content that is deliberated only by the Plan and Budget Commission, not by any relevant secondary commission with sufficient elaboration before being voted on in the plenary. Simultaneously, the president issued 162 decrees, 88 of which were revisions to previous decrees. More than 5,000 presidential decisions, including urgent expropriation, the setting of tax rates, and the appointment of public officials, were issued and only 4,488 were published in the Official Gazette.

During the same legislative years, a mere 12,082 (14%) of the 85,506 submitted questions were answered, typically superficially or procedurally. The number of parliamentary inquiry motions exceeded 10,000, with less than 3% being accepted. Although the president, deputy president, and ministers are subject to criminal liability (1982 Constitution Articles 105 and 106), no motion of parliamentary investigation has been submitted since July 2018. This is simply because a qualified majority of MPs is required to tabulate a motion of investigation (by absolute majority, 301); accept a motion and open an investigation (by three-fifths majority, 367); and submit the person(s) in charge to the Constitutional Court/Supreme Criminal Tribunal (by two-thirds majority, 400).

Despite the claims made by promoters of the presidential system, the GNAT’s oversight function has not improved since the 2018 system change (Bakırcı 2021). The GNAT has not examined the audit reports of the public institutions’ accounts prepared by the Turkish Court of Accounts (TCA) on behalf of the parliament. Türkiye’s V-Dem legislative indicators (V-Dem 2023) are far lower than the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) averages. The GNAT’s investigative capacity (-2.09) and executive branch oversight (-2.17) are practically insufficient. The legislative constraints on the executive index decreased to a lower level (0.17). Without sufficient deliberation, the executive branch frequently bypasses the parliament in the preparation of legislation (-0.24), and the quality of regulations is weak (-0.24).

The president appoints and dismisses cabinet members and deputy ministers without legislative approval. Illiberal employment policies, which were not merit based, led to an increase in the executive branch’s control over institutional accountability mechanisms and loyalty to it (Soyaltin-Colella 2023). Presidential Decree No. 3 entitles the president to appoint and remove more than 2,000 public officials, including higher civil servants such as governors, ambassadors, university rectors, and directors. In October 2023, the Constitutional Court (Constitutional Court Decision 2023/171) revoked this decree, ruling that presidential decrees can regulate appointment criteria only for public officials who appear in the annexed tables of Decree No. 3.

The members of the Constitutional Court, the Court of Cassation, the Council of State, and the TCA are appointed by the president, either directly or through the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (CJP) or a majority of the GNAT. The CJP is composed of 13 members: the minister of justice is the president and the deputy minister is the ordinary member, with no other members elected by judges among peers; four are elected by the president; and seven are elected by the GNAT with a majority vote. Group of States Against Corruption (2023) found that the president’s influence on the judiciary was incompatible with European standards and threatened judicial independence. The effect of the executive branch on the judiciary is demonstrated in Türkiye’s V-Dem scores, which are lower than the OECD averages (V-Dem 2023). Although constitutional and legal audits of presidential decrees and decisions are possible, the new judicial structure or noncompliance with judicial decisions render the audit ineffective. Neither do the executive and judicial authorities comply with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.

As an alternative to the current presidential practice, the six-party opposition alliance (i.e., the Nation Alliance), led by the Republican People’s Party, introduced a “strengthened parliamentary model” with an efficient checks-and-balances mechanism before the early-2023 elections. However, it failed to win a majority in the GNAT due to a dispute over the presidential candidate and the lack of an election strategy. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party, which faced a landslide loss in the municipal elections on March 31, 2024, follow a political softening; however, it may not result in a return to the parliamentary system.

To conclude, after six years of experience, concentrating all powers in the executive branch in Türkiye has led to de-parliamentarization, de-institutionalization, and eventually de-democratization. Restoring the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the independence of the judiciary through the efficient operation of democratic institutions such as GNAT is the highest priority of the current agenda.