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Chile's Difficult Return to Constitutional Democracy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 November 2022

Jose Luis Cea
Jose Luis Cea*
Affiliation:
Catholic University of Chile
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PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , Summer 1987 , pp. 665 - 673
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 1987

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References

1 According to the twenty-ninth transitory provision of the 1980 Constitution, “It shall be understood that if the citizens should not approve the proposal submitted to plebiscite referred to in the 27th transitory provision, the presidential term referred to in the 13th transitory shall be extended, as a matter of law. The incumbent President of the Republic and the Government Junta shall remain in office in accordance with governing provisions, for the term of one more year. Upon completion of this term, all the precepts of the Constitution shall be in full force.”

2 1980 Constitution, Articles 8 and 82, Numbers 7 and 8.

3 Constitutional Tribunal sentence of January 31, 1985.

4 1980 Constitution, Article 19, Numbers 20–24.

5 Ibid., Article 96, letter b.

6 Ibid., Articles 62 and 64.

7 Ibid., Article 40, Numbers 2–3. In addition, consult the twenty-fourth transitory provision.

8 Ibid., Article 32, Number 15.

9 Ibid., Article 24, Article 32, Numbers 9, 10 and 12.

10 Ibid., Article 40, Numbers 2–3.

11 Ibid., Article 41, Numbers 2–4.

12 Ibid., twenty-seventh transitory provision.

13 Ibid., eighth transitory provision, and Article 95, as well as Article 45.

14 Ibid., eighteenth transitory provision letter A in relation to the twenty-first transitory provision letter D.

15 Constitutional Tribunal decision issued on October 31, 1985.

16 The recently enacted law regarding registration procedures set up a very time-consuming manual mechanism to inscribe each citizen. Electronic systems were dismissed by the government on the basis that, in spite of being more rapid, they also were far more bound to fraudulent manipulation by the politically non-neutral electoral bureaucracy charged with handling them.

17 1980 Constitution, twenty-ninth transitory provision.

18 Ibid., Article 118.

19 Ibid., Article 19, Number 15, fifth clause.

20 Ibid., Article 64.

21 Ibid., Article 48, Number 1.

22 Ibid., Article 40, Number 2.

23 Ibid., Article 73.

24 According to reliable sources cited in the center-rightist Chilean weekly “Que Pasa” of January 14, 1987, while in 1968 the two richest tenths of the Chilean population were earning 44.5% of national income, that figure had risen to 54.03% in 1985.