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Hitting Two Birds with One Stone: How Russian Countersanctions Intertwined Political and Economic Goals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2019

Paulina Pospieszna Open the ORCID record for Paulina Pospieszna [Opens in a new window] ,
Joanna Skrzypczyńska  and
Beata Stępień
Paulina Pospieszna
Affiliation:
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland
Joanna Skrzypczyńska
Affiliation:
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland
Beata Stępień
Affiliation:
Poznan University of Economics and Business, Poland
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Abstract

This article explicates the intertwined economic and political goals behind the imposition of countersanctions through an analysis of their premises and outcomes for Russia’s domestic economy. The evidence supports the argument that retaliation was designed to benefit the Russian domestic food industry, reorient trade relations, and bolster domestic public support for this sector while politically penalizing sanctioning countries. An important contribution of this article is to demonstrate how sanctions imposed on nondemocratic target countries, which play an important role in international affairs, is like a tit-for-tat game, which may have additional effects and also unintended political, economic, and social consequences not yet observed.

Type
Article
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 53 , Issue 2 , April 2020 , pp. 243 - 247
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2019 

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References

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