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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 March 2019
In my remarks I would like to draw attention to the role of history in the Tribunal's reasoning concerning the regime of islands, both as regards its approach to historical uses of maritime features and in particular its approach to determining what it was the drafters of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) intended. My contention in these remarks is that the Tribunal took an unashamedly developing-state oriented view in its conception of the object and purpose of the regime of islands, thus foregrounding perspectives that were present at the time of the negotiation of UNCLOS but which are not necessarily given much attention in the contemporary English-language literature. Before turning to this perspective, one must closely scrutinize the Tribunal's reading of UNCLOS Article 121.
1 These comments draw on a paper published in 8 Asian J. Int'l L. 51 (2018).
2 South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Award, para. 475 (Perm. Ct. Arb. July 12, 2017) [hereinafter Award].
3 Id., paras. 483–84.
4 Id., para. 487.
5 All references in this paragraph are to: Award, supra note 2, para. 497 (emphases added).
6 Id., para. 500 (emphasis added).
7 Id., para. 503.
8 All references in this paragraph are to: Award, supra note 2, paras. 514–15.
9 Id., para. 515 (emphasis added).
10 Id., para. 519.
11 Id., para. 520. See further id. para. 542, also repeating the word “home.”