The COVID-19 pandemic highlights a long-known but often neglected aspect of international relations: the ability of disease to challenge and change all aspects of security, as well as the ability of public policies to change the course of disease progression. Diseases, especially mass epidemics like COVID-19, clearly affect political, economic, and social structures, but they can also be ameliorated or exacerbated by political policies, including public health policies. The threat of pandemic disease poses a widespread and increasing threat to international stability. Indeed, the political implications of pandemic disease have become increasingly evident as COVID-19 has precipitated death, economic collapse, and political instability around the globe. Any pandemic disease can precipitate catastrophes, from increasing health care costs to decreased productivity. This theoretical discussion highlights the intertwined interactions between social, political, and economic forces and the emergence and evolution of pandemic disease, with widespread implications for governance and international security.

Scholars, policymakers, and citizens alike remain invested in the impact of infectious diseases worldwide. Studies have found that emerging diseases and disease outbreaks burden global economies and public health goals. This article explores the potential link between measles outbreaks and various forms of civil unrest, such as demonstrations, riots, strikes, and other anti-government violence, in four central African countries from 1996 to 2005. Using a difference-in-differences model, we examine whether disease outbreaks have a discernible impact on the prevalence of civil unrest. While our findings indicate that the relationship between disease and civil unrest is not as strong as previously suggested, we identify a notable trend that warrants further investigation. These results have significant implications for health and policy officials in understanding the complex interplay between state fragility, civil unrest, and the spread of disease.

While numerous studies have examined how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected health care systems, supply chains, and economies, we do not understand how the pandemic has impacted the security of democratic and authoritarian states from a global standpoint. Thus, this study examines how COVID-19 has affected the security of democratic and authoritarian regimes. In conducting a historical, qualitative review of the security effects of the pandemic, we find that COVID-19 significantly affected domestic and international security for democratic and authoritarian states in both similar and varied ways. Additionally, the manner in which states responded to the pandemic was often conditioned by their regime type and by the nature of the governing leadership during the pandemic. These findings have important implications in considering how COVID-19 affected the security of democratic and authoritarian states, how regime type shapes government responses to infectious disease outbreaks, and how democratic and authoritarian states may respond to future pandemics.

This article offers a new perspective on when and why individual-level authoritarian perceptions of security threats change. We reexamine claims that authoritarian members of the public responded to the COVID-19 pandemic in a counterintuitive fashion. The response was counterintuitive in that, rather than a desire for a stronger government with the ability to impose measures to address the pandemic and its consequences, authoritarian individuals rejected a stronger government response and embraced individual autonomy. The article draws on perceptions of security threats—issues that directly or indirectly harm personal or collective safety and welfare—from surveys in two different contexts in England: 2012, when perceptions of the threat from infectious disease was low relative to most other security threats, and 2020, when perceptions of the personal and collective threat of COVID-19 superseded all other security threats. We argue that the authoritarian response was not counterintuitive once we account for the type of threat it represented.

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States is actively reshaping parts of its national security enterprise. This article explores the underlying politics, with a specific interest in the context of biosecurity, biodefense, and bioterrorism strategy, programs, and response, as the United States responds to the most significant outbreak of an emerging infectious disease in over a century. How the implicit or tacit failure to recognize the political will and political decision-making connected to warfare and conflict for biological weapons programs in these trends is explored. Securitization of public health has been a focus of the literature over the past half century. This recent trend may represent something of an inverse: an attempt to treat national security interests as public health problems. A hypothesis is that the most significant underrecognized problem associated with COVID-19 is disinformation and the weakening of confidence in institutions, including governments, and how adversaries may exploit that blind spot.

Recent research suggests that contemporary American society is marked by heightened hostile racial rhetoric, alongside increasing salience of White nationalists who justify an ideology of racial hierarchy with claims of biological superiority. Media coverage of such genetics research has often emphasized a deterministic (or causal) narrative by suggesting that specific genes directly increase negative outcomes and highlighting reported genetic differences between racial groups. Across two experimental studies, we examine the effect of the media’s portrayal of scientific findings linking genes with negative health and behavioral outcomes on measures of racism. We find that deterministic genetic attributions for health and behavioral outcomes can lead to more negative racial out-group attitudes. Importantly, we also investigate potential interventions in the presentation of genetic science research. Our research has implications for understanding racial attitudes and racialized ideology in contemporary American politics, as well as for framing scientific communication in intergroup contexts.

According to the bioethical principle of individual decisional autonomy, the patient has a right of informed consent to any medical or experimental procedure. The principle is politically liberal by advocating significant individual freedom as guaranteed by law and secured by civil liberties. When practiced in illiberal communities, might it have a political liberalizing effect? I respond first by analyzing cross-national norms of individual decisional autonomy to identify tensions with illiberal community; second, by examining examining Singapore in a single case study to show that liberal bioethics does not promote political liberalization; and third, by showing that the possibility of practicing liberal bioethics in research, clinically as well as in education, does not require a democratic order, and that liberal bioethics is unlikely to encourage the liberalization of illiberal political communities. Hence, it may never contribute to the development of globally effective cross-national norms for the legal regulation of bioethical research and clinical practice. Fourth, to bolster this analysis, I anticipate several possible objections to various of its aspects.