This article analyzes political participation and the attitudes of Muslim-Americans. Assessing national patterns, the first part highlights several regression models, discerning the impact of race/ethnicity, gender, foreign born status, age, and education on political activity and attitudes. I also compare changes in voting patterns among respondents between the 2000 and 2004 elections. The second half is based on in-depth interviews of Muslims from St. Louis, Missouri, probing more directly particular shifts in views and participation since September 11. Among the national sample, South Asians and Middle Easterners largely supported Republican George W. Bush in 2000, while African-Americans voted for Democrat Al Gore. However, by 2004, race and ethnicity were no longer statistically significant factors dividing the Muslim vote; instead, support largely went to Democrat John Kerry. Changes in voting patterns between 2000 and 2004 were also evident in the St. Louis sample of South Asians and Middle Easterners. They generally cited unfavorable views of Muslim treatment both at home and abroad since the War on Terror began as major reasons for these changes. Partisan and voting shifts were not evident among African-Americans, who have been consistent Democrats. However, many African-Americans in addition to Middle Easterners and South Asians reported heightened interest in politics and similar changes since September 11. Only Bosnians, who are relatively new to the United States, report few changes. This is largely because they have yet to develop firm political identities. Among both samples, Muslim-Americans generally exhibit high rates of participation in various political activities, many reporting increasing interest and involvement since September 11. Therefore, regardless of the hardships they may currently feel, Muslim-Americans are not hiding in the shadows but are fully participating in the political sphere.

The role of religiosity as an important predictor of partisan identification has been well researched over the years, with most of our understanding of religion focused on Christianity. However, it is not clear that religiosity operates equally for the partisan identification of non-Christian religious groups. One of the most discussed religious minority groups in the United States today is Muslim-Americans. Numbering between 2.3 million and 7 million, Muslim-Americans have been the focus of considerable debate regarding religion and American political inclusion. We argue that religiosity does influence Muslim-American party identification, however not in the same manner as with other groups. While the two major political parties encourage religiosity among Protestants, Jews, and Catholics, they are either silent or opposed to religiosity among Muslims within their parties. Thus, religiosity among Muslim-Americans may not necessarily lead to partisan identification with either Republicans or Democrats. Rather, high levels of religiosity, coupled with perceptions of discrimination against Muslims, may lead many to oppose both major political parties and instead identify with “none of the above.” This is not to say that Muslim-Americans reject civic engagement or political participation in the United States, but rather the two political parties have not carved out a space to welcome Islam, as they have for Christianity and Judaism. We examine new data from the 2007 Muslim-American Public Opinion Survey to assess the predictors of partisan identification among Muslims in the United States.

Legislators' responsiveness to constituency preferences is an accepted cornerstone of American representative democracy. Focusing on key domestic anti-terrorism votes during the 109th Congress, this study explores whether or not the presence of Muslim-Americans in a district influenced House members' roll-call behavior. We apply and test two competing theories of representation: the congruence theory and the minority backlash hypothesis. Using original data on Muslim-American constituency size, our analysis indicates little evidence of a representational backlash and some evidence that both Democratic and Republican members are positively responsive in their roll-call behavior to the presence of Muslim voters in their districts.

American Muslim representation in elected office has lagged behind that of other groups of comparable size. Muslims now make up 2% of the total United States population and enjoy much larger concentrations in some urban areas. American Muslims are also disproportionately educated and enjoy a higher average socio-economic status than members of groups with similar numbers that have made strides in terms of political representation in our democracy. Yet Muslims have not made similar advances in the political arena. There are a number of reasons that might account for this situation. Here, we look at one possible explanation that is especially intriguing — and perhaps a bit troubling: the idea that voters make different causal attributions for the behavior of Muslim candidates for office. We employ an experimental design to examine the attributions participants use to “explain” the behavior of hypothetical Muslim and non-Muslim candidates. We conduct two experiments involving distinct political offices: State Attorney General and United States Senator. We find that respondents generally do not attribute behavior differently in the case of Muslim and Christian candidates, except in the case of lax prosecution of a terrorism case. Politically sophisticated respondents assume that a Muslim prosecutor who does not have a large Muslim constituency is sympathetic to Muslim terrorists, but not one with a larger Muslim voting base. Non-sophisticates attribute his behavior to such motivations regardless of the concentration of Muslims in his district.

Although American society is religiously pluralistic, not all religious groups enjoy equal levels of public approval and support. Indeed, America has a history of viewing members of nontraditional religious groups with considerable distrust and suspicion. Two religious groups in particular — Muslims and Mormons — have come under fire in recent years, though not necessarily for the same reasons. Muslims and Mormons have frequently been viewed as outside the mainstream of American culture and, perhaps for that reason, have suffered from discrimination, threats, and violence. This article examines Americans' views of these two important and rapidly growing groups, using social identity theory as the primary vehicle of analysis. The theory proves useful in helping us explain variance in Americans' views of these two groups. While a variety of social, political and religious variables help to explain Americans' views of Muslims and Mormons, religious variables have the greatest impact.