The psychological security index is an important predictor of democratic norm support. However, insufficient attention has been paid to the separate but independent contributions of dogmatism, self-esteem, and trust, the three components typically combined to create that index. Thus, we do not know the unique influence of these components on democratic norm commitment. We also do not know the exact nature of the influence of the multiple dimensions of religion (belief, belonging, behavior) on the separate psychological security components. Using structural equation modeling and two national surveys, we examine the religion-psychological security-democratic norm support relationship. Our findings do not fully support a negative association between religion and democratic values. In fact, no matter the influence of religious belief, belonging, or behavior on psychological security, the mediating link of psychological security to democratic norm support is what is most important. Indeed, any differences that manifest as a consequence of the various dimensions of religion disappear in the religion-psychological security-democratic norm support linkage. As such, anti-democratic values are a product of one's psychological attributes and are almost entirely unrelated to one's religion. Further, our findings challenge the theoretical underpinnings of the psychological security index, as we find little evidence that the separate components used to construct the composite measure, particularly trust, are an appropriate proxy for authoritarianism.

Although violence over Northern Ireland's constitutional position has largely subsided, the problem of sectarian animosity between sections of the Protestant Unionist British and Catholic Irish Nationalist population remains. One such area of communal contestation is attitudes to Protestant parades, organized mainly by the Orange Order. For many Protestants, Orange Order marches are legitimate cultural, religious, and political expressions of Protestant culture, loyalty to the British Crown and a pro-United Kingdom position. For many Catholics, the Orange Order is seen as a sectarian and anti-Catholic organization, which prohibits its members marrying Catholics or attending Catholic Church services. The Parades Commission was established two decades ago to adjudicate on Orange Order parading routes. Its decisions have sometimes involved re-routing marches away from Catholic areas and the inability to satisfy both sides has been followed by riots on several occasions at the annual height of the Protestant “marching season.” This article examines levels of support or antipathy toward Orange Order marching rights among Protestants and Catholics. Drawing upon evidence from the most extensive recent study of public opinion in Northern Ireland, the 2015 Economic and Social Research Council general election study, the piece tests the importance of demographic, religious, political, and geographical variables in conditioning attitudes towards Orange parades.

Contested sacred sites, over which different religious groups assert claims to exclusivity, have drawn scholarly attention to the spatial interaction between religion and politics. However, the gendered dimensions of inter-communal religious-political disputes over sacred space, and women's roles in these site-specific conflicts, have been largely neglected. Using a case study of Orthodox Jewish women's activism for access to Temple Mount al-Haram al-Sharif, this article demonstrates how attention to gender and to women's engagement in inter-communal conflict over sacred places can illuminate unique intra-communal processes that aim to make a contested sacred site increasingly indivisible for parties to the conflict.

The Catholic Church often plays a policy and mobilization role in American politics. We assess the degree to which the Catholic Church hierarchy — including national and state conferences of bishops — can provide uniform information to parishioners about political participation. Using a textual analysis of information distributed to parishioners in Florida in the 2012 election, we evaluate how much political information is conveyed to parishioners, the sources of this information, and the factors associated with higher or lower levels of information. While we find that most parishes provided information related to the election, there is wide diversity in the types and sources of information. And, while the Catholic hierarchy attempted to provide messaging about the importance of political participation, not all parishes complied with these efforts. Our findings are consistent with the ideas that the local community and hierarchical structure combine to shape the behavior of the parishes.

Following armed conflict, why do some members of ethno-religious groups vote for political parties that use religious appeals while others do not? I argue that internal displacement shapes the relationship between conflict and post-war political outcomes. Specifically, individuals who become internally displaced during armed conflict will use their religious faith to cope with the trauma of displacement, thereby strengthening their religiosity. This heightened religiosity then leads them to prefer religiously oriented parties after conflict. Analyzing survey data from Bosnian Muslims, I show that internally displaced respondents were more likely to vote for the religious nationalist Party of Democratic Action nearly a decade after conflict. Employing matching analysis, I then verify that these internally displaced persons became more religious than other respondents compared to before the war. My findings therefore provide evidence that trauma and religiosity combine to shape post-war voting behavior for members of ethno-religious groups.

Using data collected between 2004 and 2008 from the National Politics Studies, this study explores the impact of race on the likelihood of attending worship settings that provide supportive services for and preach sermons about immigrants. It also considers the degree to which attending such worship settings associate with the perceptions that Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics hold of immigrants. We find that while Hispanics are more likely than Whites and Blacks to attend such “immigrant-conscious” congregations, attending such congregations more strongly correlates with Whites rejecting anti-immigrant frames and accepting positive frames than is the case for Blacks and Hispanics.