While our intuition is that religious elites influence the political behavior of their audiences, just how that influence takes place is essentially unknown. Among many possible mechanisms, we investigate a new one: the effects of the decision-making process information that is included in elite statements. We believe that “process cues” paralleling those preferred by respondents bolster trust in the source and augment the ability to form determined attitudes. We test this proposition in the context of a survey experiment that focuses on environmental racism. We present competing arguments provided by a reverend and a professor, variably assigning the arguments and presence of elite process cues. We find that process cues do affect trust and attitudinal ambivalence, but in ways that challenge some pervasive assumptions about the integrity and importance of religious groups in politics.

Compassionate conservatism is usually dismissed on the American political left as an empty slogan intended to mystify the real roots and aspirations of conservative politics. However, conservative Christian organizations and churches now conduct well-coordinated compassion campaigns on contested social issues such as sexual and reproductive rights. Through compassion campaigns, the Christian right also disseminates particular forms of political pedagogy regarding sexuality and compassion for followers who are subject to the movement's influence. Here, I turn to Hannah Arendt to analyze the politics of compassion at work in the ex-gay movement and in antiabortion projects such as Silent No More. This article presents evidence for a turn to compassionate pedagogies on the Christian right, analyzes these projects, and suggests ways that Arendt's political thought can inform our readings of conservative Christian compassionate discourse and political practices.

Is the origins of life debate occurring in the United States an illustration of the culture wars? To address this question we examine attitudes toward evolution using data from the 2006 General Social Survey. Multinomial logistic regression models indicate that attitudes about whether humans today evolved from earlier species of life are more fully explained by orthodox Christian doctrine, not religious tradition, as the culture wars thesis suggests. However, an isomorphism between orthodox Christine doctrine and conservative political ideology has not occurred. While a liberal political ideology is strongly related to acceptance of evolution, these data suggest that only a certain group of political conservatives, those who accept orthodox Christian doctrine, reject evolution as sound scientific theory. Additionally, respondents who “don't know” if evolution is “true” or “false” differ from both the believers and skeptics in that they appear to lack the exposure to either science or orthodox Christian doctrine that would give them clear guidance about what to think in regards to evolution.

Starting from theories of secularization and of religious individualization, we propose a two-dimensional typology of religiosity and test its impact on political attitudes. Unlike classic conceptions of religiosity used in political studies, our typology simultaneously accounts for an individual's sense of belonging to the church (institutional dimension) and his/her personal religious beliefs (spiritual dimension). Our analysis, based on data from the World Values Survey in Switzerland (1989–2007), shows two main results. First, next to evidence of religious decline, we also find evidence of religious change with an increase in the number of people who “believe without belonging.” Second, non-religious individuals and individuals who believe without belonging are significantly more permissive on issues of cultural liberalism than followers of institutionalized forms of religiosity.

This article explores the impact of Muslim organizations and Muslim political parties in Indonesia and Malaysia and their relationship to democracy. Questions addressed are as follows: How does the political system (broadly described) facilitate or constrain the goals of various Muslim organizations (both groups in society and political parties)? What roles do these Muslim organizations play in impacting politics and where (or in what areas of) in the political process are they most effective? Under what circumstances have Muslim associations and/or parties been a force for (or antagonistic to) democratization? Given the ethnic and regional diversity in Malaysia and Indonesia, the initial hypotheses for these questions are as follows: under authoritarian and semi-authoritarian rule Muslim organizations actually have greater opportunities to polarize rhetoric as they appeal to citizens based on claims of moral supremacy, fulfillment of social welfare needs, and some level of criticism of a restricted or corrupted political order. At different times the Pan-Malayan Islamic Association (PAS), the leading Muslim party in Malaysia (and a dominant opposition party) has had limited appeal to voters. Under more democratic conditions, Islamic groups or parties may need to moderate their appeals, and/or build coalitions with secular or non-Islamic groups in order to win power and influence in the larger political system. Muslim political parties exist in both Malaysia and Indonesia; their power and influence have varied over time. This project aims to explain why these parties have had more support at some times than others and under what conditions they may moderate their demands and policy choices to accommodate pluralist leanings.