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Theory and Methods in the Study of Distributive Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 August 2017

Michael Albertus
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Abstract

While many scholars have moved toward using individual-level data to test theories of distributive politics, no studies have ever explicitly examined differences between individual and aggregate analyses of a distributive program. By leveraging nationwide individual-level data on both revealed voter preferences and the actual receipt of particularistic benefits through a contemporary Venezuelan land reform initiative, this article demonstrates that scholars can most effectively test and refine individual-level theories of distributive politics by combining both individual- and macro-level data. There are at least two advantages to doing so. First, comparing and contrasting findings from data at different levels of analysis can enable researchers to paint a more complete picture of distributive targeting. Second, when distributive benefits can be impacted or redirected by subnational politicians, as is common with many distributive programs, individual-level data alone can generate mistaken inferences that are an artifact of competing targeting attempts at different levels of government instead of initial targeting strategies. I demonstrate both of these points and discuss practical and simple recommendations regarding data collection strategies for the purposes of effectively testing theories of distributive politics.

Type
Research Notes
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 7 , Issue 3 , July 2019 , pp. 629 - 639
Copyright
© The European Political Science Association 2017 

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Footnotes

*

Michael Albertus, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 5828 Pick Hall, Chicago, IL 60637 ([email protected]). To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2017.25

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