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Follow the majority? How voters coordinate electoral support to secure club goods

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 December 2020

Dominik Duell Open the ORCID record for Dominik Duell [Opens in a new window]
Dominik Duell*
Affiliation:
University of Essex, Colchester, UK
*
Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Voters often favor candidates who benefit them individually but may coordinate their support with their social group on other candidates in exchange for policies targeting their group. In a laboratory experiment, I induce group identities to investigate the behavior of voters facing such trade-offs. I find that groups with low within heterogeneity often secure the club good from a candidate who is also individually beneficial to a majority of the group. In more heterogeneous groups, coordination on that candidate often fails and while the group still receives club goods, it is from a candidate whose policies are otherwise individually costly to most of the group. The results highlight the role strategic considerations play in the formation of group-based electoral coalitions.

Keywords

Game theory, Voting behavior, Club goods, Group identity, Coordination game
Type
Original Article
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 10 , Issue 3 , July 2022 , pp. 584 - 600
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the European Political Science Association

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Supplementary material: Link

Duell Dataset

Dataset

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EDGO9P
Link
Supplementary material: PDF

Duell Supplementary Materials

Duell Supplementary Materials

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