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Credibility and Commitment in Crisis Bargaining*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 June 2013

Mark Fey ,
Adam Meirowitz  and
Kristopher W. Ramsay
Mark Fey
Affiliation:
University of Rochester, Harkness Hall, Rochester, NY, USA
Adam Meirowitz
Affiliation:
Princeton University, Corwin Hall, Princeton, NJ, USA
Kristopher W. Ramsay
Affiliation:
Princeton University, Corwin Hall, Princeton, NJ, USA
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Abstract

Although scholars of international security share a skepticism for the extent to which agreements can be externally enforced, much existing game-theoretic work involves strong forms of commitment. Building on the canonical model of crisis bargaining, this article analyzes the role of two forms of commitment in bargaining: the ability to commit to a settlement and the ability to commit to end negotiations and initiate war fighting. The findings show that, contrary to expectations, allowing a proposer to retract their offer after learning of its acceptance does not lead to greater demands. Instead, a rational actor can be best off if he or she honors the accepted agreement in crisis bargaining, even though the act of accepting an offer changes the proposer's beliefs about the probability that an offer is acceptable. However, allowing a proposer to continue bargaining in lieu of fighting does change the dynamics of bargaining, although this effect diminishes as players become more patient. Finally, when there is no commitment to offers (or fighting after a rejected proposal), the behavior is the same as that found in the model with only renegotiation of agreements, and thus mirrors the behavior in the model in which both forms of commitment are present.

Type
Original Articles
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , June 2013 , pp. 27 - 52
Copyright
Copyright © The European Political Science Association 2013 

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Footnotes

*

Mark Fey is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester, Harkness Hall, Rochester, NY, 14627, United States ([email protected]). Adam Meirowitz is John Work Garrett Professor of Politics, Princeton University, Corwin Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, United States ([email protected]). Kristopher W. Ramsay is Associate Professor of Politics, Princeton University, Corwin Hall, Princeton, NJ, 08544, United States ([email protected]). We thank Avi Acharya, Alex Hirsch, Matias laryczower, David Myatt and Francesco Squintani for useful discussions on this topic. We appreciation helpful comments at the University Wisconsin, Yale, SUNY-Binghamton, University of Warwick, the London School of Economics and the University of Rochester.

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