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Preventive War as a Result of Long-Term Shifts in Power*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 August 2015

Colin Krainin
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Abstract

This paper analyzes a complete information model of preventive war where shifts in the distribution of power play out over an arbitrary number of time periods. This analysis leads to a sufficient condition that implies war under a broader set of conditions than previously shown in the literature. This sufficient condition leads to two substantive implications: (1) preventive war can be caused by relatively slow, but persistent shifts in the distribution of power; and (2) a power shift that causes war may do so only after some delay. These insights serve to connect the long-term shifts emphasized in Power Transition Theory with the commitment problem explanation for preventive war analyzed in bargaining models of war.

Type
Original Articles
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , January 2017 , pp. 103 - 121
Copyright
© The European Political Science Association 2015 

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Footnotes

*

Colin Krainin, Postdoctoral Researcher, School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany ([email protected]). The author would like to thank Bei Cao, Terry Chapman, Daniel McCormack, Pat McDonald, Henry Pascoe, Robert Powell, Teresa Schuessler, John Slinkman, Harrison Wagner, Rachel Wellhausen, Tom Wiseman, and internal seminar and workshop participants of The University of Texas at Austin Economics and Government Departments. The author would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers whose comments have greatly improved the paper.

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