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The Reverend and the Ravens: Comment on Seawright

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Kevin A. Clarke
Kevin A. Clarke*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Harkness Hall 334, Rochester, NY 14627-0146. e-mail: [email protected]
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Extract

The purpose of this Comment is to put the current debate regarding testing necessary conditions into perspective and to point out a particularly troubling aspect of the “all cases” research design (Seawright 2002).

Prior to the recent spate of books and articles in the social sciences (Ragin 1987; Dion 1988; Braumoeller and Goertz 2000), the debate over the testing or the confirmation of necessary conditions took place in the philosophical literature, mainly in terms of Hempel's (1945) paradox of the ravens. In what follows, I briefly review Hempel's paradox and the Bayesian solution to it. I argue that Seawright's account, while Bayesian in nature, relies on an assumption that no Bayesian would be willing to make.

Type
Articles
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , Spring 2002 , pp. 194 - 197
Copyright
Copyright © Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association 2002 

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References

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