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Fairness and Rejection in the Ultimatum Bargaining Game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Catherine Eckel ,
Martin Johnson  and
Rick K. Wilson
Catherine Eckel
Affiliation:
Department of Economics (0316), Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061. e-mail: [email protected]
Martin Johnson
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside, Watkins Hall, 2nd Floor, 900 University Ave, Riverside, CA 92521. e-mail: [email protected]
Rick K. Wilson
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, MS 24, Rice University, Houston, TX 77251-1892. e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

The ultimatum game is a standard instrument for laboratory experimentalists. It has been replicated in a large number of environments and points to special considerations for fairness. Although it has been popular in the experimental community, researchers have not harnessed all the statistical power they should to evaluate the dynamics at work in this type of a bargaining game. This research uses two planned treatments, the first involving a signaling condition concerning a subject's “type”, and the second a price effect built into the structure of the game. We find that there are no significant main effects as a result of the signaling condition of a subject's type, but that there are strong effects as a result of the different payoff parameters. Using a variety of multivariate models we find important, nonobvious interactions with the gender of the subjects. The lesson that we take away from this research is that experimentalists can learn more from data collected in the tightly controlled laboratory environment by using statistical techniques that complement their research designs.

Type
Research Article
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 10 , Issue 4: Special Issue on Experimental Methods in Political Science , Autumn 2002 , pp. 376 - 393
Copyright
Copyright © Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association 2002 

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