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Discussion's Impact on Political Allocations: An Experimental Approach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Adam F. Simon  and
Tracy Sulkin
Adam F. Simon
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195-3530. e-mail: [email protected]
Tracy Sulkin
Affiliation:
Departments of Political Science and Speech Communication, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Lincoln Hall 361, 702 South Wright Street, Urbana, IL 61801. e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

In this study, we unite two experimental traditions to examine the impact of discursive processes on political decision making. We directly manipulate the presence and timing of discussion in the “divide-the-dollar” game to assess the effects of discussion on participants' allocations and perceptions of the game's legitimacy. To investigate the influence of structure, we also manipulate the presence of a majority/minority cleavage among participants. The dependent measures in all instances are the players' allocations, the outcome of the game, and psychometric indicators of legitimacy perceptions. Results indicate that the presence of discussion can generate outcomes that are perceived as more equitable and fair in some circumstances—namely, when a cleavage is present. These findings establish the utility of this paradigm, as well as an important baseline for assessing the probable impacts of proposals to integrate deliberation into political decision making.

Type
Research Article
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 10 , Issue 4: Special Issue on Experimental Methods in Political Science , Autumn 2002 , pp. 403 - 412
Copyright
Copyright © Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association 2002 

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