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The Barbarism of Virtue
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2020
Abstract
The advocates of the philosophy of engagement assert that learning and scholarship are not value-free, that there is a ubiquitous, even if implicit, commitment to a moral, and therefore basically political, standpoint in the vocation of the scholar and in the mission of the university. The first thing to note about this philosophy is its high-mindedness, its exalted conception of the role of the scholar and scholarship. However, if the commitment of the scholar is moral and not only intellectual, to virtue and not only to truth, how can this supply guidance or a principle of decision where the scholar encounters conflict among moral values? Decisions as to which values are to be given priority flow from the judgments, inescapable moral and political judgments, with which the citizen must concern himself. But the traditional view is that the primary goal of the citizen in his role as scholar is not the quest for virtue or power but the quest for significant truths. The pursuit of truth does not entail withdrawal or isolation from but service to society. Scholars cannot and should not escape the world of politics. But in a rational and humane society there must be some activities and institutions that are beyond politics.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright
- Copyright © Modern Language Association of America, 1969
Footnotes
Address delivered before the General Meeting of the Modern Language Association, 28 December 1968, New York City.
References
1 Carl E. Schorske, “Professional Ethos and Public Crisis: A Historian's Reflections,” PMLA, lxxxiii (Sept. 1968), 979–984.
2 Richard Lichtman, “The University: Mask for Privilege?” The Center Magazine, i (Jan. 1968), 2–16.
3 Lichtman, p. 10.
4 Herbert Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” in Wolfi, A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), pp. 81 ff.
5 Richard Ohmann, “The MLA and the Politics of Inadvertence,” PMLA, lxxxiii (Sept. 1968), 988.
6 “This sentence ... expresses a view to which I, like every man who attempts to be reasonable, fully subscribe ... There is no such thing as an irrational aim except in the sense of one that is impossible of realization,” Human Society in Ethics and Politics (New York, 1955), pp. vii, x.
7 Schorske, p. 982; my italics.
8 This seems to me to be the position of Richard Ohmann (note 5, above).
9 Lichtman, pp. 8 ff.
10 Schorske, p. 982.
11 P. 984.
12 Lichtman. See note 2.
13 Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” pp. 86, 88.
14 Marcuse, p. 88.
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