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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
Theism is sometimes defined by reference to the contrasted doctrines of Deism and Pantheism. Deism, it is said, lays stress on God's transcendence, while Pantheism emphasizes his immanence to the exclusion of his transcendence. Theism, on the other hand, mediates between these two one-sided doctrines and affirms that God is at once both immanent and transcendent. He is in the world and yet beyond it. This definition, however, can only be accepted with qualification because some forms of Pantheism are arrived at by stressing, not the immanence, but the transcendence of God. According to Neo-Platonism, for example, the ineffable Absolute is so transcendent in existence and value that the world is reduced to the humble status of a mere illusory appearance and all veritable reality is absorbed in the Divine. This complication of the matter means that when studying the nature of Theism it is necessary to consider the opposition between Cosmism and Acosmism as well as that between transcendence and immanence The cosmistic tendency is to affirm, whereas the acosmistic tendency is to deny, the ultimate reality of the finite individual's effective autonomy. Theism is cosmistic, in the sense that it refuses to reduce the finite individual to a mere dependent mode of God. Nevertheless, the acosmistic tendency is very evident in many so-called theistic systems—so much so in some cases, indeed, that what is alleged to be Theism really amounts to Pantheism in disguise.
page 119 note 1 Hegelianism and Personality (Edinburgh, 1887), p. 162Google Scholar.
page 121 note 1 Caird, : Spinoza (Edinburgh, 1888), p. 303Google Scholar.
page 121 note 2 See Philosophy, 07 1936, vol. xi, no. 43Google Scholar.
page 122 note 1 Op. cit., p. 312.
page 123 note 1 The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (Boston, 1885), p. 441Google Scholar; cp. The World and the Individual (New York, 1900–1901), vol. 2, pp. 138ffGoogle Scholar. A most interesting critical appreciation of Royce's philosophical theology is contained in Dotterer, R. H.: The Argument for a Finitist Theology (Lancaster, Pa., 1917)Google Scholar.
page 124 note 1 The Christian Doctrine of God (Edinburgh, 1909), p. 346Google Scholar.
page 124 note 2 The World and the Individual, vol. 2, p. 141Google Scholar.
page 124 note 3 See L'année philosophique (Paris, 1890), p. 56Google Scholar; Les dilemmes de la méta physique pure (Paris, 1901), pp. 122 ff.Google Scholar, etc.
page 124 note 4 De l'infini mathématique (Paris, 1896), pp. 508 ffGoogle Scholar.
page 125 note 1 Mrde Burgh, says that “no explanation of the problem of evil is or can be completely satisfactory.” (From Morality to Religion, London, 1938, p. 230, note 1)Google Scholar. But this statement should have been qualified by the addition of the proviso—“on the basis of Absolute Idealism.” For Metaphysical Relativism, evil is no more difficult to explain than goodness.
page 125 note 2 Ethics, 4, 73.
page 126 note 1 The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 456 ff.Google Scholar, and The Sources of Religious Insight (Edinburgh, 1912), p. 233Google Scholar.
page 126 note 2 The Nature of Truth (Oxford, 1906), pp. 170 fGoogle Scholar.
page 126 note 3 Cp. Bradley, : Appearance and Reality (London, 1897), pp. 438 ffGoogle Scholar. and Bosanquet, : The Value and Destiny of the Individual (London, 1913), pp. 249 ffGoogle Scholar. Cp. James, W.: A Pluralistic Universe (London, 1909), pp. III, 134Google Scholar. etc.
page 127 note 1 God in Christian Thought and Experience (London, 1930), pp. 95 fGoogle Scholar.
page 128 note 1 Moral Values and the Idea of God (Third Edition, Cambridge, 1924), pp. 343 fGoogle Scholar.
page 128 note 2 Ibid., pp. 492 f.
page 129 note 1 Cited by Pringle-Parrison, in his Idea of God (Second Edition, Oxford, 1920), p. 296Google Scholar.
page 129 note 1 Cp. Pringle-Pattison: op. cit., p. 407; Whitehead, : Process and Reality (Cambridge, 1929), pp. 484 f.Google Scholar; Bergson, : Les deux sources (Paris, 1932), p. 273Google Scholar; Laird, : Mind and Deity (London, 1941), pp. 55 fGoogle Scholar. In his Purpose of God (London, 1935) Matthews, Dean writes: “The self-sufficiency of God in and for Himself is an abstract idea which cannot be allowed to dominate our theology without disastrous results. To maintain that God in and for Himself is not self-sufficient is, from the standpoint of traditional Christian theology, a gross heresy. Christian thought has been dominated by the idea that the divine nature is impassable and incapable of change. I observe that Dr. Temple adheres to this venerable theological tradition, with the consequence that his views on purpose and freedom seem to me to be obscure. In my opinion, the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of God should be rejected. And we may defend this departure from the main lines of theological tradition by pointing out that the abandonment of this purely philosophical notion will bring us closer to the heart of the Christian religion.” (pp. 173 f.)Google Scholar