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Science and the Explanation of Phenomena

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

W. T. Stace
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Extract

My subject to-day falls within that branch of philosophy which is commonly called the philosophy of science. And it is intended, among other things, to illustrate, by the particular case of science, the suggestion which I made in my first lecture that all subjects, scientific, literary, moral, if you examine their first principles, will lead you back into philosophy.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 10 , Issue 40 , October 1935 , pp. 409 - 427
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1935

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References

Page 409 Note 1 The second of a series of public lectures delivered at Princeton University.

Page 414 Note 1 But see the “Note on the Concept of Explanation” at the end of this lecture.

Page 415 Note 1 I owe this point to Professor Bridgman's Logic of Modern Physics.

Page 418 Note 1 This suggestion, too, I owe to Professor Bridgman.

Page 426 Note 1 This example will make it evident to philosophical readers that what I have here called the “descriptive” function of philosophy is much the same as what many philosophers call “analysis.”