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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
By all indications, the popularity of the Sense-Datum Theory is definitely on the wane. This once-proud theory, which was perhaps the most characteristic feature of British Philosophy during the first half of this century, has been attacked from so many different sides that even its foremost protagonists have either accepted the very watered-down version according to which it is just an alternative language for speaking about the facts of perception or else they hold their peace and let the youngsters play. There are still some diehards who carry on as if nothing had happened, but they are an insignificant minority.
page 113 note 1 e.g. Chisholm, R. M.: ‘The Theory of Appearing’ in Black: Philosophical Analysis, 1950. From his most recently published work it would appear that Chisholm has changed his mind about some of the things said in that paper.Google Scholar
page 113 note 2 For discussions of the ‘alternative-language’ thesisGoogle Scholarsee Sellars, W.: ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 261-7,Google Scholar as well as Austin's, J.L. remarks in Sense and Sensibilia, VI (pp. 55-61.)Google Scholar
page 114 note 1 In ‘The Defence of Common Sense’, Contemporary British Philosophy, 2nd series, p. 217.Google Scholar Also see ‘A Reply to my Critics’ in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, Library of Living ΡPhilosophers, 1942, pp. 630 ff.Google Scholar
page 114 note 2 In ‘Perception’, pp. 3-6.Google Scholar
page 114 note 3 By Bouwsma, K. and Mace, C. A. in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore,Google Scholar and by Ayer, A.J. in Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, 1940Google Scholar and in ‘The Terminology of Sense-Data’ reprinted in Philosophical Essays, 1954.Google Scholar
page 114 note 4 Scientific Thought, part II. Mind and Its Place in Nature, Ch. IV.Google Scholar
page 114 note 5 Scientific Thought, p. 234.Google Scholar
page 115 note 1 Ibid., p.235.
page 115 note 2 Ibid., pp.239-241.
page 116 note 1 Scientific Thought, p. 243.Google Scholar
page 117 note 1 For a more detailed criticism of Broad's theory, see Lean, : Perception and Matter, Ch. IV, esp. pp. 142-143.Google Scholar
page 118 note 1 Sellars, W., loc. cit., pp. 270-273 and 277-282;Google ScholarQuinton, A.: ‘The Problem of Perception’, Mind, 66 (1955); and others.Google Scholar
page 118 note 2 For a similar discussion see Gollingwood, R. G.: ‘Sensation and Thought,’ Arist. Soc. Proc, 1923-1924.Google Scholar
page 120 note 1 Arist. Ѕoc. Ѕupp. Vol. VI, p. 188.Google Scholar
page 120 note 2 loc. cit., pp. 32 ff.
page 121 note 1 See also Firth's, R. remarks on the ‘exposure hypothesis’ in ‘Sense-Data and the Percept Theory’, Mind, 58, 1949, pp. 462–465.Google Scholar
page 122 note 1 0p. cit.Google Scholar
page 122 note 2 Quinton recognises this too. Thus he writes, ‘The sophistication (required to describe ‘experience’) arises with the deliberate supposition that conditions obtain which we have reason to suppose do not’. But he does not seem to interpret this as prejudging a negative answer to the question whether we are aware of ‘experience’ in ordinary perception.Google Scholar
page 124 note 1 I am of course simplifying the matter considerably. Many other factors besides the judgment of the distance may be involved in perceiving that what we are seeing is the sun, e.g. the fact that one's eyes smart, etc.
page 125 note 1 For an argument similar to this see Ayer, A. J.: Philosophical Essays in note at bottom of pages 79-80.Google Scholar
page 126 note 1 Note that if this fact supported anything at all, it would also support Quintan's explanation, since e.g. that we can continue to say ‘It looks bent’ is also explained by the fact that there is something bent in our visual ‘experience’ which we could see in an introspective frame of mind.Google Scholar
page 127 note 1 For detailed criticism of this sort, see Laird, J., ‘A Study in Realism’;Google ScholarBarnes, W. H. F., ‘The Myth of Sense-Data’, Arist. Soc. Proc., 1944-1945;Google ScholarRyle, G., The Concept of Mind; etc.Google Scholar