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Real and Apparent Value

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Ralph Barton Perry
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Extract

One of the chief grounds of objection to the view that value is a function of interest is afforded by the recognized distinction between what really is valuable and what merely seems to be valuable. This objection was urged against hedonism at the very dawn of European ethics, when it was contended that pleasure is an illusory experience of value (or seeming good) which reason corrects, or a merely provisional experience of value which reason confirms. The same objection is embodied in the assumption of common sense that present inclination, instead of constituting unimpeachable evidence of value, is often false and misleading.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 7 , Issue 25 , January 1932 , pp. 62 - 67
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1932

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References

page 62 note 1 “Value as an Objective Predicate,” to appear shortly in the Journal of Philosophy.

page 64 note 1 International Journal of Ethics, 1930 (40), p. 479.

page 65 note 1 I shall deal with this topic briefly because I have considered it fully in my General Theory of Value (§ 247), and do not think that my critics have added anything.

page 65 note 2 E.g. Journal of Philosophy, 1925 (22), p. 131.

page 66 note 1 Dr.Pell, Orlie A. H., Value-Theory and Criticism, 1930, pp. 41, 56.Google Scholar

page 67 note 1 Philosophy, 1927, p. 230.