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The Purity of Agent-Regret
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 August 2021
Abstract
I argue for a novel understanding of the nature of agent-regret. On the standard picture, agent-regret involves regretting the result of one's action and thus regretting one's action. I argue that the standard picture is a flawed analysis of agent-regret. I offer several cases of agent-regret where the agent feels agent-regret but does not regret the result itself. I appeal to other cases where an agent's attitude towards something depends upon whether or not they are involved in that thing. I argue that the same applies to actions: sometimes an agent's attitude towards a result differs from their attitude to their involvement in bringing about that result. Agent-regret is regret about my own action, but it need not involve regret about something in the world. I end by considering how this picture of agent-regret allows us to respond to a particular criticism of agent-regret.
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2021
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