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Pragmatic Justification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Nicolas Rescher
Nicolas Rescher
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburg.
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 39 , Issue 150 , October 1964 , pp. 346 - 348
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1964

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References

1 Note that the practical efficacy of the method of the ‘Fair Weather Optimists’ lies precisely in its ‘anti-inductivist’ feature of being willing to regard every new rainy day as the first of two, i.e. of a ‘pair’, when as a matter of fact ‘pairs’ are the exception rather than the rule.

2 In technical jargon the point may be put as follows: The (relative frequency of) predictive success in applying an inductive method or a prediction-rule need not necessarily correlate positively with the (actual or even the expected) utility arising from adoption of this procedure as a principle of action.