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Pragmatic Arguments*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Perelman
Affiliation:
University of Brussels

Extract

Sometimes we draw conclusions about a thing's existence or its value by considering what are thought to be its consequences. I shall say that an argument is pragmatic when it consists in estimating an action, or any event, or a rule, or whatever it may be, in terms of its favourable or unfavourable consequences; what happens in such cases is that all or part of the value of the consequences is transferred to whatever is regarded as causing or preventing them.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy1959

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References

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