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On Equivocation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2003

Tom Stoneham
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Abstract

Equivocation is often described as a fallacy. In this short note I argue that it is not a logical concept but an epistemic one. The argument of one who equivocates is not logically flawed, but it is unpersuasive in a very distinctive way.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 78 , Issue 4 , October 2003 , pp. 515 - 519
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2003

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