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The Notion Of Object In The Phenomenology Of Merleau-Ponty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Colin Smith
Colin Smith
Affiliation:
University College, London.
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Extract

A Great deal of contemporary French philosophy is phenomenology. Phenomenology, roughly speaking, rejects the positivistic view of objective reality, and puts forward an ‘intentional’ reality, brought about tosome extent by our own purposes, individual and collective. Merleau-Ponty starts from the phenomenological position, and assigns to objective thinkingits origin and place within phenomenological thinking. My references will be almost exclusively to the Phenomenology of Perception, which is really a phenomenology of consciousness, starting from the problem of perception. Perception, according to Merleau-Ponty, is one way of ‘being conscious’, which is not essentially different from any other way of being conscious.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 39 , Issue 148 , April 1964 , pp. 110 - 119
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1964

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References

1 This view of the object and concept as provisional achievements is considered in relation to a wider philosophical contextin Colin, Smith, Contemporary French Philosophy, Methuen, 1964.Google Scholar