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Morality as a Rational Requirement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 July 2002

Julian Baggini
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Abstract

John Searle has recently produced an argument for strong altruism which rests on the recognition that ‘I believe my need for help is a reason for you to help me’. The argument fails to recognize the difference between ‘a reason for me for you to help me’ and ‘a reason for you for you to help me.’ These are two logically distinct types of reason and the existence of one can never therefore be enough to establish the existence of the other. The existence of this logical gap is a major obstacle for any argument for morality as a rational requirement that attempts to universalise from reasons individual persons have to act morally.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Philosophy , Volume 77 , Issue 3 , July 2002 , pp. 447 - 453
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2002

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