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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
§ 1. The purpose of this paper is to inquire what distinction can or should be drawn between logic on the one hand and on the other psychology, so far as psychology concerns itself specifically with the problem of knowledge. The suggestions I have to make are very provisional, and are based mainly on a criticism of the late Mr. Bradley's views of the nature and scope of logic and psychology. For this reason I have for my title adapted from Bradley's article on “Association and Thought” a famous phrase which seems to me to illustrate fairly well the meeting-point of these two sciences in his thinking. At the same time this very criticism is itself chiefly founded upon philosophical considerations with which Bradley at least as much as any other writer has taught me to sympathize. In short, I assume some sort of Absolute Idealism; and my excuse must be the further assumption—which I hope the reader will more readily tolerate— that the proper criticism of any theory is that which it can be shown to pass upon itself in the course of its own development.
1 For a suggestion as to the ultimate value of this qualification, see § 40 ff.
2 I am besides greatly indebted to ProfessorJoachim, H. H. , who most kindly read this paper in manuscript, and made me valuable suggestions, and also to two articles by him which appeared in Mind, one on “Psychical Process” in 1909 and another on “Personal Identity” in 1914.Google Scholar
1 Republic, 473a.
1 A Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology, p. 33; Mind, 1890.
1 “The Relation of Sociology to Philosophy,” Mind, 1897.
1 But see Appearance and Reality, p. 299, footnote.
1 P. 298.
1 English empirical philosophy has never clearly distinguished logic from psychology, and it is ominous that Bradley should adopt as adequately characterizing thought at one level of explanation some of the main features of a theory whereby two levels are perpetually confounded.
2 P. 30.
1 Cp., however, Principles of Logic, Ed. II, p. 613, where Bradley seems to confine psychology more strictly: “If we take as an instance the phenomena of the religious consciousness, the psychologist must not neglect them. But he studies their nature taken merely as a kind of occurrence in the soul, with their influence on the course of psychical events. And as to the reality otherwise and as to the worth [italics mine] of these phenomena psychology is silent. With the question whether, and how far really, its mental fact is also the vital presence of an eternal God, it can have no concern.” If this is not neglect of the religious consciousness, what is?
1 P. 361.