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Making Sense of Retributivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2001

J. Angelo Corlett
J. Angelo Corlett
Affiliation:
San Diego State University
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Abstract

This paper explicates and challenges John Rawl's argument concerning a rule-utilitarian theory of punishment. In so doing, it argues in favour of a retributivist theory of punishment, one that seeks to justify, not only particular forms of punishment, but the institution of punishment itself. Some crucial objections to retributivism are then considered: one regarding the adverse effects of punishment on the innocent, another concerning proportional punishment, a third pertaining to vengeance and retribution, a Marxian concern with retributive punishment, and a concern with the concept of desert. Each objection is deflected in order to ward-off what seem to be the most serious criticisms of a retributivist view of punishment and to clarify the depth of the retributivist position.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 76 , Issue 1 , January 2001 , pp. 77 - 110
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2001

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